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THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION ACT
By Theodore J. St Antoine
The ModelEmploymentTerminationAct(META), which
the Uniform Law Commissioners have recommended for
adoption by all state legislatures, could provide the most
significant legal change of this quarter century in the American workplace. In addition, ifthe annual caseload ofgrievance
arbitrations in this country now stands at somewhere around
65,000,theActholdsthepotentialforatleastquadruplingthat
figure.
Our colleague Jack Stieber has calculated that there are 60
million U.S. employees who are not protected by union
contracts or civil service laws, and are thus subject to the
employment-at-will doctrine. They can be fired for any reason
whatsoever (absent a civil rights violation), and, in fact, 2
million of them are discharged each year. Stieber further
estimates that 150,000-200,000 of these worlcers would have
a claim under the ·~ust cause" standards generally applicable
in unionized industries.
During the past couple of decades the courts in 40-45
jurisdictions have relied on three main theories to carve out
certain exceptions to the traditional principle ofemploymentat-will. Those three theories include tort (violations ofpublic
policy, or "abusive" or "retaliatory" discharge); breach of an
express or implied contract, embodied in a personnel manual
or an oral assurance at the time of hiring; and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. For both employers
and employees, however, there are serious deficiencies in
these common law doctrines. They constitute a fragile safeguard for the worker who has been wronged. Yet, in a given
case, they can wreak havoc on a hapless employer who runs
afoul of them.
The tort or violation ofpublic policy claim will be limited
by its nature to rare, egregious situations. Few employers are
going to order their employees to commit perjury or engage in
an illegal price-fixing scheme, and then fire them if they
refuse. To avoid a contract obligation, all an employer has to
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defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
the like. There would be no extinguishment ofrights or claims
under express contracts or under statutes or administrative
regulations, such as those dealing with job discrimination,
''whistle blowing," or occupational safety and health.
Remedies would be confmed to those customary under
the original Civil Rights Act of 1964, namely, reinstate~~nt
with or without back pay and attorneys' fees for a prevadmg
party. Severance pay is allowable when reinstatement is
impracticable, up to a maximum of36 months' pay in the
most egregious cases. Compensatory and punitive damages
are expressly excluded.
An appropriate state agency would ordinarily appoint the
arbitrator. Awards under this statutory scheme would be
subject to slightly greater judicial review than awards in
consensual arbitrations. The grounds would include corruption, an exceeding of authority, or a prejudicial error oflaw.
As a matter of principle, the new public right to be free
from unjust dismissal, like any other public right, ought to be
enforced at public expense. Yet the prospect of an additional
and ill-defmed fiscal burden for today's financially troubled
states could be fatal for a measure that is bound to generate
controversy in any event META therefore suggests, as an
alternative to the normal filing fee, that the states consider
imposing a substantial portion of the cost on the parties
themselves, perhaps with a cap on the employee's share in an
amount equal to one or two weeks' pre-tennination pay.
Two hotly debated provisions of META allow employers
and employees to "opt out" of the statute. The parties may
eliminate the good cause guarantee and substitute a mandatory
severance payment of at least one month's pay for each year
of employment. Or they may agree on a private arbitration
procedure to resolve their dispute. "Freedom of contrac~"
carried the day here, despite the concern that an employee IS
seldom in a position to bargain effectively with an employer.
Courts may be able to minimize the risks of employer overreaching by resort to such theories as economic duress,
contracts of adhesion, and procedural fairness.
Getting META (or its equivalent) adopted in this country
will be a long, hard process. The plaintiff's bar opposes it
because it will eliminate large contingent fees. Many nonunion employers oppose it because it will reduce their suzerainty
in the workplace. The AFL-CIO has endorsed the principle of
legislation prohibiting wrongful discharge but will probably
not assign it a high priority. I remain confidentthough that the
United States will not remain forever the only major industrial
democracy in the world without generalized legal protection
against unjust dismissal. The action of the Uniform Law
Commissioners- a mainstream group of influential lawyers,
judges, and legislators- is itself indicative ofwhat education
can accomplish. Initially, the Commissioners considered discharging the META drafting committee before we had even
finished presenting our first report. Two years later, on the
fmal vote by states, the Commissioners approved META by
the overwhelming vote of39 to II.
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do is refrain from making any commitment about future job
security. Even existing policy statements against arbitrary
dismissal can generally be rescinded, as long as there is
adequate notice to the affected workers. The covenant ofgood
faith and fair dealing, potentially the most expansive protection, has been recognized in only a handful of states and is
being cut back there. Finally, the great majority of successful
plaintiffs are professionals or upper-level management personnel. Rank-and-file workers who are fired usually have too
little money at stake to make their case worthwhile for lawyers
operating on a contingent fee basis.
At the same time, the results may be devastating for an
employer who does get entangled in a wrongful discharge
court suit.Various California studies show that a plaintiffwho
can get to the jury wins around 75 percent of the time, with an
average award of approximately $450,000. Multimillion
dollar verdicts for single individuals are not uncommon. Even
successful defenses may cost between $100,000 and $200,000.
In addition, a recent RAND study indicates that the "hidden
costs" incurred by American business in trying to avoid this
onerous litigation, including the retention of undesirable
employees, may amount to I 00 times more than the adverse
judgments and other legal expenses.
The central defects of the existing common law regime
are that employees' substantive rights are too limited and
uncertain, the remedies against employers are too random and
often excessive, and the decision making process is too
inefficient for all concerned. META, for which I had the
opportunity to serve as reporter or draftsperson, attempts to
address each of these problems. The approach is practical,
balanced compromise. The Act guarantees the vast majority
ofworkers certain irreducible minimum rights against wrongful discharge, but substantially reduces the liability of
emp toyers. As the preferred method of enforcement, the Act
substitutes the use of arbitrators in place of long, expensive
court proceedings. That also means the elimination of wayward verdicts by emotionally aroused juries.
Employees covered by META could not be discharged
except for "good cause." Good cause could consist of either
misconduct or poor performance on an individual worker's
part, or the economic needs and goals of the enterprise as
determined by the employer in the good faith exercise of
business judgment. No difference is intended from the application of the familiar "just cause" standard appearing in
collective bargaining agreements.
META would cover most full-time employees (i.e., those
working 20 or more hours a week) after one year ofservice with
an employer. An exception exists for small employers, those
having less than five employees. Unionized employees are
covered to the extent permitted by federal preemption law.
The inclusion of public employees is left to state option.
A major tradeoff in META is the displacement or extinguishment ofmost common law actions based on terminations
forbidden under the Act. Those would include implied contract claims and tort claims grounded in such theories as
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